Minimax and its generalization to mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is the cornerstone of our understanding of strategic situations that require decision makers to be unpredictable. Using a dataset of nearly half a million serves from over 3000 matches, we examine whether the behavior of professional tennis players is consistent with the Minimax Hypothesis. The large number of matches in our dataset requires the development of a novel statistical test, which we show is more powerful than the tests used in prior related studies.
Introduction
von Neumann's Minimax Theorem for two-player zero-sum games and Nash's generalization to equilibrium in n-player non-zero sum games are the foundations of modern game theory. Nash equilibrium and its extension to decision making in dynamic settings or settings with incomplete information are routinely applied in theoretical models and are the basis of much of our understanding of strategic interaction. Here we test the predictive accuracy of the theory using data from the …eld.
Laboratory experiments have been enormously successful in providing tightly controlled tests of game theory. The results of these experiments, however, have not been supportive of the theory for games with a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium: student subjects do not mix in the equilibrium proportions and subjects exhibit serial correlation in their choices rather than the serial independence predicted by the theory.
Data from professional sports, however, has been far more supportive of theory.
Using poker as a motivating example, Walker and Wooders (2001) argue that while the rules of a game which requires players to be unpredictable may be simple to understand, it is far more di¢ cult to understand how to play well. Student subjects no doubt understand the rules, but they have neither the experience, the time, nor the incentive to learn to play well. In professional sports, in contrast, players have typically devoted their lives to the game and they have substantial …nancial incentives.
The present paper re-evaluates the question of whether the behavior of sports professionals conforms to theory using a unique dataset from Hawk-Eye, a computerized ball tracking system employed at Wimbledon and other top championship tennis matches. It make several contributions: With a large dataset and a new statistical test we introduce, it provides a far more powerful test of the theory than in any prior study. It also provides a broader test of the theory by analyzing both …rst and second serves, for both men and women. Finally, combining the Hawk-Eye data with a dataset on player rankings, it shows that even tennis professionals di¤er in the degree to which their behavior conforms to theory: the behavior in the …eld of higher ranked players conforms more closely to theory.
A critique of the results of prior studies has been that they have low power to reject the null hypotheses implied by the theory. 1 study 459 and 1417 penalty kicks, respectively. Our dataset contains the precise trajectory and bounce points of the tennis ball for nearly 500,000 serves from over 3000 professional tennis matches, and thereby allows for an extremely powerful test of the theory.
The large number of matches in our dataset requires that we develop a novel statistical test for our analysis. When the number of points in each match is small relative to the overall number of matches, as it is in our dataset, we show that the test introduced in Walker and Wooders (2001) is not valid: it rejects the implication of the minimax hypothesis that winning probabilities are equalized, even when the null is true. The new test that we develop, based on the Fisher exact test, rejects the true null hypothesis with probability of exactly at the signi…cance level. We show via Monte Carlo simulations that our test, as an added bonus, is substantially more powerful than the test used in Walker and Wooders (2001) and the subsequent literature. 2 An unusual feature of our test is that the test statistic itself is random, and thus a di¤erent p-value is realized each time the test is conducted. It would be perfectly valid to run the test once and reject the null hypothesis if the p-value is less than the signi…cance level. It is more informative, however, to report the empirical density of p-values obtained after running the test many times, and this is what we do.
When reporting our results we will make statements such as "the empirical density of p-values places an x% weight on p-values below :05."
We …nd that the win rates of male professional tennis players are consistent with the minimax hypothesis. Despite the enormous power of our statistical test -due to the large sample size and the greater power of the test itself -we can not reject the null hypothesis that winning probabilities are equalized across the direction of serve. We do not reject the null for either …rst or second serves. For …rst serves, the empirical density of p-values places no weight on p-values below .05 (i.e., the joint null hypothesis is never rejected at the 5% signi…cance level). For second serves, it places almost no weight on p-values below .05.
The win rates for female players, by contrast, conform somewhat less neatly to theory. The empirical density function of p-values places a 44.9% weight on p-values below .05 for …rst serves, and a 16.0% weight on p-values below .05 for second serves.
Nonetheless, the behavior of female professional tennis players over 150,000 tennis serves conforms far more closely to theory than the behavior of subjects in comparable laboratory tests of the minimax hypothesis. Applying our test to the data from O'Neill's (1987) classic experiment, for example, we obtain an empirical density function of p-values that places probability one on p-values less than .05. Hence the null hypothesis that winning probabilities are equalized is resoundingly rejected based on the 5250 decisions of O'Neill's subjects while we obtain no such result for women, despite having vastly more data.
A second implication of the minimax hypothesis is that the players' choices of direction of serve are serially independent. We reject serial independence for both men and women, for both …rst and second serves. Players switch the direction of their serve too frequently to be consistent with randomness. Negative serial correlation in the direction of serve is more pronounced for women than men, and the di¤erence is statistically signi…cant.
We conjecture that men's greater physical strength causes men's payo¤s in the contest for each point to be more sensitive to departures from equilibrium play than in women's tennis. In our dataset, the average speed of the …rst serve for men is 160 kph, while for women it is 135 kph. 3 In men's tennis, the server wins 64% of all the points when he has the serve, while in women's tennis the server only wins 58% of the points. It is evident that the serve is relatively more important than in men's than women's tennis. A receiver in men's tennis who fails to play minimax (and equalize the server's winning probabilities) is much more vulnerable to being exploited by the server. Consequently, there is a stronger selection pressure against male receivers who fail to equalize the server's winning probabilities. Likewise, in men's tennis, a server who is predictable because he fails to randomize in the direction of his serve is much more vulnerable to exploitation by the receiver.
We also …nd evidence that the behavior of higher ranked (i.e., better) players conforms more closely to the minimax hypothesis. Higher-ranked male players exhibit less serial correlation in their …rst serve than lower ranked players. For female players, by contrast, rank does not have a statistically signi…cant e¤ect on the degree of serial correlation, again perhaps a consequence of the smaller importance of the serve in 3 For …rst serves by men, on average only 0.45 seconds elapses between the serve and the …rst bounce.
women's tennis. In each case, as one might expect, the rank of the receiver has no statistically signi…cant e¤ect on the degree of serial correlation exhibited by the server.
To further investigate the e¤ect of ability on behavior, we divide the data into two subsamples based on the receiver's rank. (It is important to keep in mind that it is the receiver's strategy that determines whether winning probabilities are equalized across directions of serve.) In one subsample the receiver was a "top" player, i.e., above the median rank, and in the other the receiver was a "non-top"player. We test the hypothesis that winning probabilities are equalized across the direction of serve on each subsample separately. For men, win rates conform closely to the minimax hypothesis on each subsample.
As noted above, win rates conform to the minimax hypothesis somewhat less neatly for women than for men. Signi…cantly, in women's matches in which the receiver is a "top"player, we do not come close to rejecting the hypothesis that winning probabilities conform to the minimax hypothesis, while the equality of winning probabilities is resoundingly rejected for the subsample in which the receiver is not a top player. This result show that behavior of women conforms more closely to the minimax hypothesis for better receivers.
Related Literature
Walker and Wooders (2001), henceforth WW, was the …rst paper to use data from professional sports to test the minimax hypothesis. It found that the win rates of male professional tennis players conformed to theory, in striking contrast to the consistent failure of subjects to follow the equilibrium mixtures (and equalize payo¤s)
in laboratory experiments. Even tennis players, however, switch the direction of their serve too often to be consistent with the random play predicted by the theory. WW …nd, however, that professionals deviate far less from random play than do student subjects in comparable laboratory experiments. Right. A challenge in using penalty kicks to test theory is that most kickers take few penalty kicks and, furthermore, a given kicker only rarely encounters the same goalie.
The later is important since the contest between a kicker and goalie varies with the players involved, as do the equilibrium mixtures and payo¤s. 4 A key contribution of CLG is the precise identi…cation of the predictions of the minimax hypothesis that are robust to aggregation across heterogeneous contests. It …nds that the data conforms to the qualitative predictions of the model, e.g., kickers choose "center" more frequently than goalies. The null hypothesis that the probability of scoring is the same for kicks to the left and to the right is rejected at the 5% level for only 2 of the kickers. 6 Importantly, his analysis ignores that a kicker generally faces di¤erent goalkeepers (and di¤erent goalkeepers face di¤erent kickers) at each penalty kick.
In professional tennis, unlike soccer, we observe a large number of serves, taken in an identical situations (e.g., Federer serving to Nadal from the "ad" court), over 4 CLG provide evidence that payo¤s in the 3 3 penalty kick game vary with the kicker, but not with the goalie. 5 In a linear probability regression they …nd weak evidence against the hypothesis that kickers equalize payo¤s across directions based on the subsample of 27 kickers with 5 or more kicks. This null is rejected at the 10% level for 5 of kickers, whereas only 2.7 rejections are expected. 6 PH aggregates kicks to the center and kicks to a player's "natural side" and thereby makes the game a 2 2 game.
a period of several hours. 7 It is plausible therefore to assume that the relationship between the players'actions and the probability of winning the point is the same in every such instance, and thus the data from a single match can be used to test the minimax hypothesis. There is no need to aggregate data as in CLG or PH.
The present paper is less closely related to a literature that examines the e¤ect of experience in the …eld on behavior in the laboratory (see, e.g., Cooper In Section 2 we present the model of a serve in tennis and the testable hypotheses of the minimax hypothesis. In Section 3 we describe our data. In Section 4 we describe our test of the hypothesis that winning probabilities are equalized and we present our results, while in Section 5 we report the results of our test that the direction of serve is serially independent. In Section 6 we establish that the behavior of higher ranked players conforms more closely to theory than for lower ranked players. In Section 7
we show that (i) the WW test of equality of winning probabilities is valid when the number of points in each match is large relative to the number of matches, but is not valid conversely, (ii) our new test is valid when the number of matches is small (as in WW) or large, (iii) our new test is more powerful than the test used WW and subsequent studies, and we (iv) apply the test to the data from HHT.
The Serve in Tennis
We model each point in a tennis match as a 2 2 normal-form game. The server chooses whether to serve to the receiver's left (L) or the receiver's right (R). The receiver simultaneously chooses whether to overplay left (L) or right (R). The probability that the server ultimately wins the point when he serves in direction s and the receiver overplays direction r is denoted by sr . Hence the game for a point is represented as in Figure 1 . Since one player or the other wins the point, the probability that the receiver wins the point is 1 sr , and hence the game is completely determined by the server's winning probabilities.
The probability payo¤s in Figure 1 will depend on the abilities of the two players in the match and, in particular, on which player is serving. In tennis, the player with the serve alternates between serving from the ad court (the left side of the court) and from the deuce court (the right side). Since the players'abilities may di¤er when serving or receiving from one court or the other, the probability payo¤s in Figure 1 may also depend upon whether the serve is from the ad or deuce court. The probability payo¤s di¤er for men and women. 8 At the …rst serve, the probability payo¤s include the possibility that the server ultimately wins the point after an additional (second) serve.
If the …rst serve is a fault, then the server gets a second, and …nal, serve. The server chooses whether to serve L or R and the receiver simultaneously chooses whether to overplay L or R. If the second serve is also a fault, then server loses the point. Since the second serve is the …nal serve, the probability payo¤s for a second serve will be di¤erent than those for a …rst serve. 9 We assume that within a given match, the probability payo¤s are completely determined by which player has the serve, whether the serve is from the ad or deuce court, and whether the serve is a …rst or second serve. Thus, there are eight distinct "point" games in a match. We assume that in every point game LL < LR and RR < RL , i.e., the server wins the point with lower probability (and the receiver with higher probability) when the receiver correctly anticipates the direction of the 8 As noted in the Introduction, men win 64% of the points when they have the serve, while women win only 56%. 9 Indeed, …rst and second serves are played di¤erently. In our data set, the average speed of a …rst serve is 160 kph and of the second serve is 126 kph (35.3% of …rst serves fault, but only 7.5% of second serves fault).
serve. Under this assumption there is a unique Nash equilibrium and it is in (strictly) mixed strategies.
10
A tennis match is a complicated extensive form game: The …rst player to win at least four points and to have won two more points than his rival wins a game. The …rst player to win at least six games and to have won two games more than his rival wins a set. In a …ve set match, the …rst player to win three sets wins the match. The players, however, are interested in winning points only in so far as they are the means by which they win the match. The link between the point games and the overall match is provided in Walker, Wooders, and Amir (2011) which de…nes and analyzes a class of games (which includes tennis) called Binary Markov games. They show that minimax (and equilibrium) play in the match consists of playing, at each point, the equilibrium of the point game in which the payo¤s are the winning probabilities sr .
Thus play depends only on which player is serving, whether the point is an ad-court or a deuce-court point, and whether the serve is a …rst or second serve; it does not otherwise depend on the current score or any other aspect of the history of play prior to that point.
Two testable implications come from the theory. According to the minimax hypothesis, a player obtains the same payo¤ from all actions chosen with positive probability. Thus, the server's payo¤ at the …rst serve, i.e., the probability of winning the point at the …rst serve, is the same for serves left and for serves right, when delivered from the same court. Likewise, his probability of winning the point at the second serve is the same for serves left and serves right, when delivered from the same court. A second implication of the theory, which comes from the analysis of the extensive form game representing a match, is that the direction of the serve is serially independent.
In addition to varying the direction of the serve, the server can also vary its type ( ‡at, slice, kick, topspin) and speed. In a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, all types of serves which are delivered with positive probability have the same payo¤. Therefore it is legitimate to pool, as we do, all serves of di¤erent types but in the same direction.
Our test of the hypothesis that the probability of winning the point is the same for serves left and serves right can be viewed as a test of the hypothesis that all serves in the support of the server's mixture have the same winning probability. 10 Nash equilibrium and minimax coincide in two-player constant sum games, such as this one.
The Data
Hawk-Eye is a computerized ball tracking system used in professional tennis and other sports to precisely record the trajectory of the ball. As the use of the Hawk-Eye system is usually limited to the main tournaments, the dataset contains a large proportion of matches from top tournaments (e.g., Grand
Slams). Within tournaments, the matches in our dataset are more likely to feature top players as the Hawk-Eye system is used on the main courts and was often absent from minor courts at the time of our sample. As a consequence, the matches contained in the dataset tend to feature the best male and female players.
11 Hawk-Eye has been used to resolve challenges to line calls since 2006, which is evidence of the greater reliability of Hawk-Eye to human referees.
For each point played, our dataset records the trajectory of the ball, as well as the player serving, the current score, and the winner of the point. 12 When the server faults as a result of the ball failing to clear the net, then we extrapolate the path of the serve to identify where the ball would have bounced had the net not intervened. same theoretical winning probability. We observe a total of 465,262 serves in the cleaned data. While Hawk-Eye automatically records bounce data, the names of the players, the identity of the server and the score are entered manually. This leads to some discrepancies as a result of data entry errors. To ensure that the information we use in our analysis is correct, we check that the score evolved logically within a game: the game should start at 0-0, and the score should be 1-0 if the server wins the …rst point and 0-1 if the receiver wins the point. We do this for every point within a game. If there is even one error within a game, we drop the whole game. While conservative, this approach ensures that our results are based on highly accurate data. 
Testing for Equality of Winning Probabilities
According to the minimax hypothesis, the probability that the server wins the point is the same for serves left and for serves right. In the data, for each "point game" i we observe the number of serves to the left and right, n 
We …rst describe our test for whether the server's winning probabilities are equal in an individual point game. From this test we construct a test of that winning probabilities are the same for serves right and serves left in every point game.
Individual Play and The Fisher Exact Test
Let p i j denote the true, but unknown, probability that the server will win the point when the …rst serve is in direction j. We use the Fisher exact test to test the null hypothesis that p i L = p i R = p i for point game i, i.e., the probability that the server wins the point is the same whether serving to the left or to the right. The beauty of the Fisher exact test is that it does not require knowledge of the true (but unknown) value of p i . Moreover, it is an exact test as does not rely on the asymptotic distribution of the test statistic. As we shall see, the later is essential for constructing a valid test of the joint hypothesis of the equality of winning probabilities, given the large number of point games in our sample.
Let f (n LS ; n S ; n L ; n R ) denote the probability, under the null, that the server wins n LS serves to the left, conditional on winning n S serves in total, after delivering n L and n R serves to the left and to the right, respectively, i.e., f (n LS ; n S ; n L ; n R ) Pr(n LS jn S ; n L ; n R ). This conditional probability is computed as follows:
where n RS = n S n LS and B(n jS ; n j ; p) is the binomial probability of winning n jS of n j serves in direction j 2 fL; rg when the winning probability is p. The equality follows from the fact that the binomial processes for serves left and serves right are independent. By direct calculation we have
Of critical importance, this conditional probability is exact for …nite samples and does not depend on p.
14 Let F (n LS ; n S ; n L ; n R ) be the associated c.d.f., i.e.,
In its standard application, the Fisher exact test rejects the null hypothesis at the 5% signi…cance level if F (n LS ; n S ; n L ; n R ) :025 or F (n LS ; n S ; n L ; n R ) :975. For any given marginal distribution (identi…ed by n S , n L , and n R ), since the density f is discrete, a 5% test will not typically have a size of exactly 5%.
We employ a randomized test in order to obtain a test of exactly the correct size. For each point game i, let t i be the random test statistic given by a draw
The density is de…ned for n LS 2 fmax(n S n R ; 0); : : : ; min(n S ; n L )g. We require in particular that n LS max(n S n R ; 0), i.e., the number of winning left serves must be (i) non-negative, and (ii) at least as great at the total number of winning serves minus the number of right serves. Likewise, we require n LS min(n S ; n L ), i.e., the number of winning left serves can not exceed either the number of winning serves overall or the number of left serves. 
An Illustrative Example
Consider the hypothetical data below, for three di¤erent point games, all of which have the same marginal distributions.
L R S 4 6 10 One can think of a realization of n S = 5 or n S = 9, while not being su¢ ciently extreme to lead to an outright rejection the null, as providing some evidence against it and thus the null is rejected with positive probability. At the individual level, the rate at which equality of winning probabilities is rejected at the 5% or 10% signi…cance level seems -to the eye -to be roughly consistent with the theory.
Aggregate Play and the Joint Null Hypothesis
We next consider the joint null hypothesis that p i L = p i R for each point game i. WW test this hypothesis by applying the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test to the empirical distribution of the p-values, one for each point game, obtained from the 16 Since each point game has fewer observations of second serves than …rst serves, the stochastic nature of the t's will tend to be more important for second serves. This is evidenced by the higher standard deviations for second serves. Likewise, since we tend to observe fewer serves for women, the standard deviations are higher for women.
Pearson Goodness of …t test. Under the joint null hypothesis, each p-value is asymptotically uniformly distributed. They …nd that the null is resoundingly rejected for O'Neill's (1987) experimental data, whereas the null is not rejected when applied to the serve and return data from professional tennis. 17 Other authors have followed this approach to test for equality of winning probabilities in professional soccer (PalaciosHuerta (2003)) and laboratory experiments with human subjects (Levitt-List-Reiley (2010), Van Essen and Wooders (2015)).
Here
show later, the test we construct is more powerful than the WW test.
To illustrate, we begin by applying this new test to the WW data. As described earlier, for each point game i, let t i be the random test statistic given by a draw from close to being rejected for male professional tennis players. To construct the density, the horizontal axis is divided into 100 equal-sized bins Hence the failure to reject the joint null hypothesis of equality of winning probabilities is indeed completely robust to the realization of the t values.
Before proceeding it is important to emphasize several aspects of our test. First, it is a valid test in the sense that if the null hypothesis is true (i.e., p i L = p i R 8i) then the p-value obtained from the KS test is asymptotically uniformly distributed 18 In WW (2001), the value of the KS test statistic was .670 and the associated p-value was .76.
(as the number of point games grows large). Second, once the data has been realized, the distribution of p-values obtained from running the test repeatedly (as in Figure   3 Figure 4 shows the result of applying the same test to the Hawk-Eye data for …rst serves by men. As noted in Table 2 , this test is based on 226,298 …rst serves in 7, 198 point games. Figure 4 In only one instance (.02%) of 5000 trials of the KS test is the null hypothesis rejected at the 5% level. In only .24% of the trials is it rejected at the 10% level. The mean p-value is :689, which is far from the rejection region. Our data also allow a powerful test of whether the play of women conforms to the minimax hypothesis. In the Hawk-Eye data for women, there are 110,886 …rst serves and 41,376 second serves, obtained in 4,108 point games. For women, while the empirical and theoretical c.d.f.s of t-values appear to the eye to be close, for many realizations of the t's the distance between them is, in fact, su¢ ciently large that the joint null hypothesis of equality of winning probabilities is rejected. Figures 6 and 7 show, respectively, the results of KS tests of the hypothesis that p i L = p i R for all i, for …rst and second serves, respectively. For …rst serves, the null is rejected at the 5% and 10% signi…cance level in 44.92% and 73.46% of 5000 trials, respectively.
The results for second serves are more ambiguous. While the p-values shown in 19 In a point game with n L left serves, n R right serves, and n S successful serves, there are min(n S ; n L ) max(n S n R ; 0) + 1 distinct intervals from which t values are drawn. The behavior of female professional tennis players, however, conforms far more closely to equilibrium than the behavior of student subjects in comparable laboratory tests of mixed-strategy Nash play. Figure 8 
Serial Independence
We test the hypothesis that the server's choice of direction of serve is serial independent. For each point game i, let s i = (s and n R occurrences of R is known. Denote this probability by f R (r; n L ; n R ) and let F R (r; n L ; n R ) denote the associated c.d.f. At the 5% signi…cance level, the null is rejected if F R (r; n L ; n R ) :025 or if 1 F R (r 1; n L ; n R ) :025; i.e., if the probability of r or fewer runs is less than :025 or the probability of r or more runs less less than :025. In the former case, the null is rejected since there are too few runs,
i.e., the server switches the direction of serve too infrequently to be consistent with randomness. In the later case, the null is rejected as the server switches direction too frequently.
To test the joint null hypothesis that …rst serves are serially independent, we employ the randomized test introduced in WW. In particular, for each point game i we draw the random test statistic t i given by a draw from
. Under the joint null hypothesis of serial independence, each t i is distributed U [0; 1].
We then apply the KS test to the empirical distribution of the t values. 
Comparing Male and Female Players
To determine the degree of serial correlation in …rst serves, and whether the difference between male and female players is statistically signi…cant, we compute, for every point game, the Pearson product-moment correlation coe¢ cient between successive serves. 21 Figure 11 shows the empirical densities of correlation coe¢ cients for male and female tennis players for …rst serves. When computing the correlation coe¢ cients for O'Neill's subjects we distinguish only between Joker and non-Joker 21 When all serves are the same direction we take the correlation coe¢ cient to be one. The mean correlation coe¢ cient for men is 0:086 and for women is 0:150, a statistically signi…cant di¤erence using a two-sample t test. 22 In fact, the empirical c.d.f.
of correlation coe¢ cients for men …rst-order stochastically dominates the same c.d.f.
for women. 23 For O'Neill's (1987) subjects, comprised of an unknown mixture of men and women, the mean is 0:113. Comparing students to tennis players, the di¤erence of the means is not statistically for either men or women, likely a consequence of the small sample size for students. Table 4 shows the result of a logit regression for …rst serves in which the dependent variable is the direction of the current serve and the independent variables are the direction of the prior serve (from the same point game) and the direction of the prior serve interacted with gender. We use a …xed e¤ect logit using only within point 22 The two-sample t test yields a test statistic of 14:16 and p-value of 4:57 10 39 . 23 The null hypothesis that the correlation coe¢ cients of males and females are drawn from the same distribution is decisively rejected by the two-sample KS test (D = 0:1322, KS p-value of 5:61 10 40 ).
variations to cancel out for variation in the equilibrium mixture across point games. The coe¢ cient estimate on Right t 1 male is statistically signi…cant and positive, indicating that men exhibit less negative serial correlation in their choices than women.
The estimated magnitude of serial correlation is strategically signi…cant. To illustrate, consider a female player who (unconditionally) serves right and left with equal probability. If the prior serve was right, the estimates predict that the next serve will be right with probability 0:418 if the server is male but will be right with probability only 0:341 if the server is female.
Expertise and Conformity to Equilibrium

Receiver Expertise and Equality of Winning Probabilities
In Section 4 we established that the win rates of male professional tennis players conform remarkably closely to theory, while the win rates for women conform somewhat less closely. In other words, in men's tennis the receiver acts to equalize the server's winning probabilities, while this tends to be less true in women's tennis. In this section we consider whether the behavior of better (i.e., higher ranked) receivers conforms more closely to theory.
The ATP (Association of Tennis Professionals) and the WTA (Women's Tennis Association) provide rankings for male and female players, respectively. Our analysis in this section is based on the subsample of matches for which we were able to obtain the receiver's ranking at the time of the match. It consists of 96% of all point games for men but, since the ranking data was unavailable for women for the years 2005 and 24 Estimating the …xed e¤ect logit regression requires that point games in which all …rst serves are in the same direction be dropped from the sample.
2006, only 69% of the point games for women. 25 The median rank for male players is 22 and for female players is 17.
According to the minimax hypothesis, the player receiving the serve acts to equalize the server's winning probabilities. Thus to evaluate the e¤ect of expertise on behavior, we partition the data for …rst serves by men into two subsamples based on whether the receiver was a "top" player (i.e., ranked 17 or higher) or a "non-top" player (i.e., ranked below 17). The three panels of Figure 12 shows the empirical c.d.f.s of p-values when testing the joint null hypothesis of equality of winning probabilities for each subsample and for the sample of all point games for which we could obtain the receiver's rank. Figure 12 show that the null hypothesis that winning probabilities are equalized is not rejected when servers face either top or non-top male receivers. The mean p-values are :458 and :548, respectively, and in only .48% and .10% of the trials is the null rejected at the 5% signi…cance level. Hence we do not come close to rejecting the hypothesis that both top and non-top male receivers act to equalize the server's winning probability. This result matches our …nding, reported in Figure 4 , that winning probabilities for male players are equalized on …rst serves, consistent with the minimax hypothesis.
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Section 4 established (see Figures 6 and 7 ) that the behavior of female professional tennis players conformed less neatly to the minimax hypothesis. For …rst serves, the 25 The ATP/WTA ranking were obtained from http://www.tennis-data.co.uk/alldata.php. 26 Figure 12 (c) shows the empirical c.d.f. of p-values obtained when testing equality of winning probabilities on the sample of all 6,902 point games for which we could obtain the receiver's rank.
It matches the empirical c.d.f. reported in Figure 4 (b) for all 7,198 point games.
joint null hypothesis of equality of winning probabilities is rejected at the 5% level in 44.92% of all trials, and the mean p-value is .076. However, for the subsample of matches in which the receiver is ranked "top"(i.e., median or higher rank) the same null hypothesis does not come close to being rejected, as shown in panel (a) of Figure   13 . In contrast, the null is decisively rejected for the subsample in which the receiver is ranked "non-top," as shown in panel (b) . Panel (c) shows the null hypothesis is decisively rejected for the sample of all female players for whom we could obtain their rankings, and is the analogue of Figure 6 (b) which reports the results for all female players.
(a) "Top"female receivers (b) "Non-top"female receivers (c) All female receivers These results suggest that the best female players, when receiving the serve, do act to equalize the server's winning probabilities, in accordance with the minimax hypothesis.
Why do both top and non-top male receivers equalize the server's winning probabilities, while for women only top receivers do? We conjecture that the selection pressure towards equilibrium is smaller for women than for men. A male receiver who fails to equalize the server's winning probabilities can readily be exploited since men deliver serves at very high speed. Such a receiver will not be su¢ ciently successful to appear in our dataset. The serve in women's tennis is much slower -fewer serves are won by aces and the serve is more frequently broken. Return and volley play is relatively more important in women's tennis, and a good return and volley player can be successful even if her play when receiving a serve is somewhat exploitable. The best female players, nonetheless, do equalize the server's winning probabilities.
Server Expertise and Serial Correlation
In Section 5 we established that, inconsistent with the minimax hypothesis, both men and women exhibit negative serial correlation in the direction of serve. Furthermore, women exhibit more negative serial correlation than men.
Optimal play for the server requires that the direction of serve be serially independent, and this is true regardless of the receiver's rank. Here we show that higher ranked male players exhibit less serial correlation than lower ranked male players, while the degree of serial correlation does not depend on rank for women. This provides evidence that when there is a strong selection e¤ect, as there is for men, then the behavior of better players conforms more closely to the minimax hypothesis. Table 5 shows the results of logit regressions in which the dependent variable is the direction of the current …rst serve and the independent variables are the direction of the prior …rst serve (in the same point game), the direction of the prior serve interacted with the server's rank, and the direction of the prior serve interacted with the receiver's rank. We measure rank as proposed by Klaassen and Magnus For men, the coe¢ cient on Right t 1 R server is positive and statistically signi…cant. Men exhibit less correlation in their direction of serve as they are more highly ranked. For women, by contrast, the server's rank is statistically insigni…cant.
As expected, the rank of the receiver is statistically insigni…cant for both men and women.
Discussion
In this section we use Monte Carlo simulations to study the properties of the KS test of the joint hypothesis of equality of winning probabilities. We show that the test is valid when the empirical c.d.f. is generated from the Pearson goodness of …t test
p-values, so long as the number of point games is not too large (as it was in WW).
If, however, the number of points games is large, as it is for our Hawk-Eye data, then the same test rejects the null even when it is true, and is thus not valid in our context. We show, in contrast, that when the empirical c.d.f. is generated from the randomized Fisher exact test t-values, then the test is valid, regardless of the number of point games.
We show further that the KS test based on the randomized Fisher t-values is more powerful than the tests used in the prior literature (the KS test based on the Pearson goodness of …t p-values and the Pearson joint test). 27 In Section 4 it was established that this more-powerful test, when applied to the WW data, con…rms their original …ndings. (See Figure 3 and the associated discussion.) Here we show that the more powerful test, when applied to HHT's data, does not support their …nding that the serve and return play of female professional tennis players and of players in junior matches is consistent with theory.
Valid Tests for Small and Large Samples
We …rst show that the KS test based on p-values from the Pearson goodness of …t test is valid for sample sizes of the kind studied in WW. A valid test generates p-values that are uniformly distributed when the null is true, and thus at the 5% signi…cance level, say, rejects the null with probability :05.
The WW dataset had 40 point games, with an average of 75.65 serves per game, 54% of the serves were to the left, and the server's empirical winning probability was :64. We simulate data to roughly match these aggregate characteristics. In the simulated data there are 40 point games, every point game has 70 serves, each serve is 27 See, for example, Table 1 and Figure 2 in WW.
equally likely to be to the left or to the right, and a serve in either direction wins with probability 2/3. In particular, the null hypothesis of equality of winning probabilities is true for the simulated data. For expositional convenience we have simulated data for homogeneous point games,
i.e., every point game has 70 serves, serves left and right are equally likely, and the probability of winning a point is 2/3 for every serve. In Appendix B we show that the results reported in this subsection are robust to simulating data that matches, point game by point game, the observed characteristics of the WW data or the Hawk-Eye data.
The Power of Our Test
We have established that the KS test of the joint null hypothesis of equality of winning probabilities is valid for large samples when the empirical c.d.f. is based on the randomized Fisher exact test t-values, but not when it is based on the Pearson goodness of …t p-values. Using t-values rather than p-values also yields a test that is more powerful against the alternative hypothesis that the winning probabilities are unequal for left and right serves, as we now establish via Monte Carlo simulations.
To evaluate the power of our tests, we follow WW and frame our discussion in terms of the following hypothetical point game, where the entry in each cell is the probability that the server wins the point. In the game's mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, the receiver chooses L with probability 2=3 and the server chooses L with probability 0:53 1=3. The probability the server wins the point is 0:65 for a serve in either direction. Denote by the probability that the receiver chooses L. Our null hypothesis H 0 that p L = p R can equivalently be viewed as the null hypothesis that = 2=3; i.e., the receiver's equilibrium mixture equalizes the server's winning probabilities. Denote by H a ( ) the alternative hypothesis that the receiver chooses L with probability . Then the server's winning We conduct Monte Carlo simulations to compare the power of our test, i.e., the probability that H 0 is rejected when H a ( ) is true, to the tests used in the prior literature.
We …rst simulate data for 40 points games with payo¤s as given above. In the simulated data every point game has 70 serves, and serves in each direction are equally likely. 30 Figure 17 (a) shows, as varies, the probability that the joint null 30 To maintain conformity with the simulations discussed earlier in this section, we simulate the data under the assumption that serves in each direction are equally likely. Simulating it with the hypothetical point game's :53 1=3 equilibrium mixture probably on left has a negligible impact on the results. Table 6 : Rejection rate for H 0 at the 5% level, N = 7000
The …rst row of Table 6 shows that that if H a (:65) is true, i.e., the server's true winning probability is p L (:65) = :6535 for serves left and p R (:65) = 0:6460 for serves right, then H 0 is rejected at the 5% level with probability :995. Our more powerful test, coupled with a far larger dataset, yields a test of the joint null hypothesis of equality of winning probabilities that is far more powerful than any reported in the prior literature.
Re-Analysis of Prior Findings
WW found that the joint null hypothesis of equality of winning probabilities did not come close to being rejected. In Section 4 we established above that the same hypothesis is not rejected for the WW data even when using the more powerful KS test based on the randomized Fisher exact test t-values (see Figure 3 and the associated discussion).
HHT studies a dataset comprised of ten men's matches, nine women's matches, and eight junior's matches. 
Conclusion
Using data from professional tennis, the present paper provides by far the most powerful test of the minimax hypothesis hereto reported. The minimax hypothesis provides two testable predictions: (i) the probability that the server wins the point is the same for serves left and serves right, and (ii) the direction of serve is serially independent. The data provides remarkably strong support for the hypothesis that winning probabilities are equalized, especially for men. It also resoundingly rejects the hypothesis that the direction of the serve is serially independent. Behavior conforms more closely to the theory for men than women in both dimensions.
When the theory preforms poorly (e.g., equality of winning probabilities for women) or fails (e.g., serial independence for men), we provide evidence that the theory works better for more highly ranked players. To our knowledge the present paper is the …rst to provide …eld evidence that more skilled players behave in the …eld in closer conformity to the theory.
9 Appendix A
Data Cleaning
There were several steps in the cleaning the data. The table below shows the numbers of serves remain after each step. As noted in the text, we …rst eliminated from our analysis every game in which the scoreline did not evolve logically. Row (i) shows the number of …rst serves, second serves, and point games that remain. We then eliminated those serves in which there is ambiguity regarding which player is serving (Row (ii)), and serves in which there is ambiguity regarding whether the serve is a …rst or second serve (Row (iii)). Finally, we drop those point games in which we observe 10 or fewer serves (Row (iv)). Moreover, it is visually evident that the empirical distribution of the KS test p-values is uniformly distributed, as it should be theoretically. Hence our conclusion in Section 6 that the KS test based on the t-values is a valid test is robust to simulating the data to match the Hawk-Eye data, point game by point game. The Power of the Our Test
The subsection "The Power the test based on the t-values was substantially more powerful than the other two. In addition, for "large"samples of 7000 point games, the test based on the t-values was extraordinarily powerful -the joint null hypothesis of equality of winning probabilities is almost surely rejected for even small departures from equilibrium play. Figure B4 is the analogue to Figure 17 and shows that the power functions in Figure 17 are largely unchanged when the data is simulated (under the null hypothesis) to match characteristic of the WW data ( Figure B4(a) ) or the Hawk-Eye data ( Figure B4(b) ). Table B1 is the analogue Table 6 . Comparing to the two tables reveals that the KS test based on the t's is slightly less powerful when the simulated data matches the characteristics of the Hawk-Eye data. This is a consequence of the fact that there were 70 serves per point game for the simulation results reported in Table 6 , while there are only 33 serves, on average, per point game in the Hawk-Eye data.
As noted previously, the Table B1 : Rejection rate for H 0 at the 5% level, N = 7198
Ball Bounces
Figure B5 below shows actual and imputed ball bounces for male second serves from the deuce court. 
